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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kristi L. Hurles timely appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction. 
On appeal, Ms. Hurles argues that the district court erred when it concluded that the 
alleged victims did not waive the accountant-client privilege, and that the district court's 
restitution calculation was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Ms. Hurles also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded civil 
attorney fees as part of the restitution order. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Hurles was employed by Jody and Butch Morrison at the Crescent No 
Lawyers Bar and Grill (hereinafter, No Lawyers Bar), and was responsible for the 
business' bookkeeping. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2, 4.) 
In 2010, the Morrisons noticed that they were losing money from the proceeds of their 
lottery account. (PSI, p.2.) The Idaho Lottery helped the Morrisons investigate the 
cause of their losses and determined that Ms. Hurls was stealing a portion of the lottery 
proceeds. (PSI, p.2.) Ms. Morrison testified that the amount of money Ms. Hurles stole 
from the lottery pull tab scheme was approximately $10,000.00. 1 (05/19/11 Tr., p.14, 
L.5-16, p.18, L.9-18.) 
As a result of that investigation and a subsequent alteration in the No Lawyers 
Bar's bookkeeping procedures, it was determined that Ms. Hurles was also responsible 
for stealing money from the Morrisons' petty cash, which was supposed to be placed in 
the ATM machine located in the entrance of the No Lawyers Bar. (PSI, pp.3-4.) 
1 Ms. Hurles is not challenging this portion of the restitution award on appeal. 
1 
The No Lawyers Bar, as opposed to the Bank which owned the ATM, provided 
the funds for the ATM, and the bank would send the Bar a check with the fees it 
collected when a patron of the Bar took money out of the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.45, 
L.19 p.46, L.25.) The Morrisons had a bookkeeping process whereby money was 
taken out of the safe which held petty cash and placed into the ATM. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.40, L.24 - p.42, L.10, p.44, LA - p.51, L.25.) The person who took the petty 
cash out of the safe and placed it into the ATM would write an IOU, to keep record of 
the amount of money taken out of the petty cash. (05/19/11 Tr., p.47, Ls.6-14.) To 
cover the amount of the IOU, Ms. Morrison would write a check which was drawn from 
proceeds which were generated from the previous day of business. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.47, L.25 - p.48, L.5, p.74, L.15 - p.75, L.4, p.76, Ls.5-8.) This bookkeeping 
process was done in order to maintain a steady balance of money in the petty cash 
and to track how much money was taken from the petty cash and placed into the ATM. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.48, Ls.6-22.) 
Ms. Hurles was one of two people, other than the Morrisons, who would 
replenish the cash in the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.47, Ls.15-18.) However, Ms. Morrison 
did not keep track of the actual IOUs because they were thrown away. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.65, L.21 - p.66, L.25, p.70, Ls.12-14.) 
As a result of an investigation into the ATM machine, Ms. Hurles eventually 
admitted to stealing funds from the ATM to compensate for the loss of her husband's 
job. (PSI, pp.3-4.) In order to accomplish the theft, Ms. Hurles would steal money by 
cashing a check and then placing only a portion of the proceeds into the ATM. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-17.) 
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Ms. Hurles was charged, by Information, with two counts of grand theft. 
(R., pp.28-29.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Hurles pleaded guilty to one count 
of grand theft and, in return, the State dismissed the remaining count. (02/17/11 
Tr., p.1, L.19-p.3, L.14; R., pp.33-34.) 
The amount of restitution Ms. Hurles owed the Morrisons became a highly 
contested issue in this case. Ms. Hurles estimated that the amount of money she stole 
from the ATM was approximately $20,000.00, while the Morrisons initially estimated 
the amount to be approximately $100,000.00. (PSI, p.4.) The Morrisons' restitution 
estimates oscillated from $284,000.00 to $90,000.00 (05/19/11 Tr., p. 79, Ls.20-25.) 
In order to calculate that amount of restitution Ms. Hurles owed the Morrisons, 
they relied on a spreadsheet created by the law firm Givens Pursley, which the 
Morrisons hired to litigate civil issues related to Ms. Hurles' theft (05/19/11 Tr., p.24, 
L.16 - p.25, L.15.) Alison Berriochoa, a paralegal at Givens Pursley, was given the 
responsibility of creating the spreadsheet. (05/19/11 Tr., p.24, L.16 - p.26, L.12.) 
Ms. Berriochoa relied on documents provided to her by the Morrisons' accountant, 
James Warr, to create the spreadsheet. (05/19/11 Tr., p. 71, L.3 - p. 73, L.19.) 
Ms. Berriochoa concluded that Ms. Hurles stole $153,920.00. (05/19/11 Tr., p.32, 
Ls.9-17.) On cross examination, Ms. Berriochoa testified that the $153,920.00 was 
based on the total amount of the checks, but that total did not take into account the fact 
that Ms. Hurles deposited between eighty to ninety percent of the checks' proceeds 
into the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-18.) Ms. Berriochoa also testified that many of 
the checks were accidentally categorized as ones Ms. Hurles cashed, when in reality 
they were endorsed and, therefore, probably cashed, by either of the Morrisons and 
not Ms. Hurles. (05/19/11 Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.36, L.14.) Ms. Morrison also testified that 
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the checks Ms. Berriochoa accidentally accredited to Ms. Hurles' restitution total were 
in fact cashed by the Morrisons. (05/19/11 Tr., p.50, L.18 p.51, L.20.) 
Ms. Morrison testified that two people with initials W.B. and D.B. also endorsed 
checks, but she does not know of any employees that had those initials. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.60, L. 12 p.61, L.14.) Ms. Morrison also testified that Ms. Hurles stole 
$99,110.00 from the petty cash. (05/19/11 Tr., p.56, L.23 p.58, L.11.) However, 
Ms. Hurles only endorsed a number of checks that totaled $39,000.00. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.56, Ls.23 - p.57, L.4.) 
At the end of the first restitution hearing, defense counsel stated that "what 
Ms. Hurles is telling me and it makes practical sense ... [s]he would cash [a] check, 
but bring back ... $900 of $1,000 ... " and place the $900.00 into the ATM. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.86, L.19 - p.87, L.3.) Defense counsel asserted, in the form of a question to 
Ms. Morrison, that their restitution figure was based on the entire amount of the check 
and did not take into account that Ms. Hurles was only taking ten to twenty percent of 
the proceeds of the cashed checks. (05/19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-21.) When 
Ms. Morrison was asked how she proved the actual amount of money Ms. Hurles took 
from petty cash, she stated that she relied on her accountant's documents and 
calculations. (05/19/11 Tr., p.71, L.21 - p.73, L.10.) Defense counsel also stated that 
upon his review of the records it appears that the Morrisons were taking money out of 
the ATM in the same manner as Ms. Hurles. (05/19/11 Tr., p.75, Ls.12-15.) 
Ms. Morrison then testified that she never told Mr. Warr that either she or Mr. Morrison 
took money out of the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.75, Ls.20-23.) Defense counsel then 
stated he wanted to call Mr. Warr to testify and made an offer of proof that he would 
testify that the Morrisons could not even establish that Ms. Hurles stole $90,000.00. 
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(05/19/11 Tr., p.79, Ls.20-25.) He also stated that he and Mr. Warr looked over the 
spreadsheet produced by Givens Pursley and they noticed that a lot of the information 
contained therein was incorrect. (05/19/11 Tr., p.80, L.23 - p.81, L.2.) 
Do to time constraints, the first restitution hearing was continued and Mr. Warr 
did not testify. (05/19/11 Tr., p.80, L.1 - p.81, L.4, p.90, Ls.4-14.) The district court 
stated that the State should provide what additional information is necessary to 
defense counsel or "[w]hat ever you think you need to make sure your client has had a 
fair ability to show the amount of restitution that's due and owing." (05/19/11 Tr., p.89, 
L.23 - p.90, L.12.) 
At the second restitution hearing Mr. Warr was sworn in and began to testify. 
(08/04/11 Tr., p.10, L.13 - p.12, L.3.) When asked the first question pertaining to the 
restitution issue, Ms. Morrison, through the State, invoked the accountant-client 
privilege. (08/04/11 Tr., p.12, Ls.4-12.) Defense counsel implicitly stated he needed 
the testimony from Mr. Warr because the Morrisons' restitution estimate was unreliable 
as it kept changing and had ranged from $400,000.00 to $100,000.00.2 (08/04/11 
Tr., p.15, Ls.15-17.) The State then argued that Mr. Warr already provided his 
restitution calculations during the presentence investigation and it established that 
Ms. Hurles stole $100,000.00. (08/04/11 Tr., p.16, L.14 -p.17, L.11.) The State then 
argued that Mr. Warr's reports were already in the record, they could be relied on by 
the court, but the Morrisons could prevent him from testifying about those reports 
because they controlled the accountant-client privilege. (08/04/11 Tr., p.16, L. 14 -
p.17, L.11.) Defense counsel argued that the Morrisons waived the privilege because 
2 The amount of restitution being sought changed again at that hearing as the State 
noted that it had come up with $6,600.00 in additional corrections, which reduced the 
amount of restitution to $155,444. (08/04/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-18.) 
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they used the documents created by Mr. Warr for the presentence investigation to 
establish the amount of restitution. (08/04/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.12-16.) Defense counsel 
also asserted that he needed Mr. Warr to testify in order to impeach Ms. Morrison with 
admissions she made to Mr. Warr. (08/04/11 Tr., p.21, L.24 - p.22, L.13.) The district 
court did not rule on the privilege issue and continued the restitution hearing. 
(08/04/11 Tr., p.23, L.19-p.24, L.19.) 
At a consolidated restitution/sentencing hearing, the district court began by 
noting that the victims were asking for $240,174.00 in restitution. (08/11/11 Tr., p.95, 
Ls.15-17.) The issue of the accountant-client privilege was addressed and defense 
counsel argued that Ms. Morrison waived the privilege by discussing conversations she 
had with her accountant at the first restitution hearing. (08/11/11 Tr., p.96, L.5 - p.97, 
L.22.) Defense counsel also argued that the privilege was waived because Mr. Warr 
was the State's witness and it was the State which told defense counsel to speak with 
Mr. Warr about the amount of restitution Ms. Hurles owed the Morrisons. (08/11/11 
Tr., p.99, Ls.5-25.) The State also pointed out that Ms. Hurles' husband alleged in the 
PS I that the Morrisons lied to the district court about the amount of restitution in order 
to get revenge. (08/11/11 Tr., p.109, Ls.13-16.) 
As mentioned above, the Morrisons also hired the firm Givens Pursley to litigate 
issues associated with the criminal case. (05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.5-10.) One of those 
lawsuits was against Mr. Warr, and the other was against the Bank of America. 
(08/11/11 Tr., p.118, Ls.18-24.) The district court stated that Ms. Hurles would have to 
pay the attorneys fees for all of this litigation. (05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.11-17.) 
Ms. Hurles objected to the attorneys' fees being included in the criminal restitution. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.18-19.) At the second restitution hearing, the State requested 
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$48,734.61 in civil attorneys' fees, all of which were awarded by the district court. 
(08/04/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-24; 08/11/11 Tr., p.132, Ls.4-6, p.135, Ls.17-25; R, pp.67-
72.) The district court also imposed a unified sentence of 14 years, with two years 
fixed. (R., pp.67-68.) Ms. Hurles timely appealed. (R., pp.73-76.) 
7 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it concluded that the Morrisons did not implicitly 
waive the accountant-client privilege? 
2. Was the district court's restitution calculation supported by substantial and 
competent evidence? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it included civil attorneys' fees as 
part of the restitution awarded in the criminal proceedings? 
8 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Morrisons Did Not Implicitly 
Waive The Accountant-Client Privilege 
A. Introduction 
In Idaho, the holders of a privilege can waive that privilege if they disclose the 
nature of the confidential information or consent to the disclosure of the confidential 
information. In this case, Ms. Hurles argues that the Morrisons waived their 
accountant-client privilege when they relied on Mr. Warr's documents to establish the 
amount of restitution. Ms. Hurles also argues that Ms. Morrison's decision to testify as 
to the contents of her conversations with Mr. Warr waived the privilege. Additionally, 
Ms. Hurles argues that the Morrisons waived privilege when the prosecutor consented 
to allow defense counsel to discuss the amount of restitution with Mr. Warr. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Morrisons Did Not 
Implicitly Waive The Accountant-Client Privilege 
The accountant-client privilege is set forth in Idaho Rule of Evidence 515 and 
Idaho Code Section 9-203A. Idaho Rule of Evidence 510 sets forth circumstances 
under which a privilege is implicitly waived in Idaho, which follows: 
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of 
the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person 
or the person's predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily 
discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or 
communication. This rule does not apply if the disclosure is itself a 
privileged communication. 
While not directly dealing with I.R.E. 510, the Idaho Supreme Court has also provided 
guidance over the implicit waiver of a privilege. In Skelton v. Spencer, 98 Idaho 417, 
418 (1977), the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants seeking specific 
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performance of certain settlement agreements. When the settlement agreements were 
first executed, the defendants were initially satisfied with them. Id. However, one of 
the defendants, Louise Spencer, changed her mind and refused to perform her 
contractual obligations. Id. The plaintiffs then sued Ms. Spencer for specific 
performance of the settlement agreements. Id. As part of her defense, Ms. Spencer 
filed an affidavit wherein she asserted that the settlement agreement was the result of 
fraud and duress perpetrated by, among other people, her former attorneys, who 
represented her during the negotiations over the settlement agreement. Id. At trial, 
and over Ms. Spencer's invocation of the attorney-client privilege, her former attorneys 
testified as to the content of their conversations with Ms. Spencer. Id. at 418-419. The 
trial court ultimately concluded that the former attorneys did not engage in fraud or 
duress during those conversations. Id. Ms. Spencer appealed. Id. 
On appeal, Ms. Spencer's primary argument was that the district court erred 
when it concluded that she implicitly waived her attorney-client privilege. Id. at 419. 
While interpreting the applicable statue, I.C § 9-203, the Idaho Supreme Court first 
reasoned that consent under the statue could be either express or implied, and when 
consent is found, the privilege is waived. Id. The Supreme Court then held as follows: 
This Court has also recognized that the attorney-client privilege is a 
defensive shield and not an offensive sword. Here, in support of her 
defense to the action for specific performance, Mrs. Spencer "testified" 
both to her communications with her attorneys throughout the settlement 
process and to the nature of their relation with her while discharging their 
duties as her attorneys. Having attacked the settlement agreements by 
this evidence, appellants then sought to prevent respondents from asking 
certain questions of appellant Louise Spencer's former attorneys, who 
were the other participants to the conversations so exposed and whose 
reputation and professional integrity were impugned. 
In these circumstances, appellant Louise Spencer's testimony 
impliedly consented to the disclosure of information she was otherwise 
privileged to withhold. Fairness requires that what she had disclosed could 
10 
not later be withheld. Moreover, having herself disclosed communications 
and conduct otherwise privileged from disclosure, the rationale behind the 
privilege would no longer be served by recognizing appellant Louise 
Spencer's efforts to invoke it as a bar to the testimony of her former 
attorneys. 
By testifying to privileged communications, and by making an issue of her 
defense the privileged matter of her relation with her former attorneys, 
appellant Louise Spencer waived the attorney-client privilege for all 
communications relevant to the settlement process and the conduct of her 
former attorneys. 
Id. at 420-421 (citation omitted). 
Ms. Hurles recognizes that the Skelton opinion was based in the context of the 
attorney-client privilege and not the accountant-client privilege. However, I.R.E 510 
applies to all privileges. While Ms. Hurles is not aware of any controlling Idaho 
authority, there is persuasive authority from other jurisdictions that address implicit 
waivers in the context of the account-client privilege. For example, in Wolfington ex rel. 
Wo/fington v. Wolfington Body Co., Inc., 2000 WL 33158566, at 236-239* (Pa. Com. Pl. 
2000), it was held as follows: 
The accountant-client privilege in Pennsylvania did not exist at 
common law and there are few Pennsylvania cases which address it. As 
stated by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, "[t]he relationship between an 
accountant and his client has been held to be one of confidentiality ... ; 
however, the statute makes only a limited change in the common law, and 
it does not extend the common-law attorney-client privilege to the 
accountant-client relationships." Agra Enterprises Inc. v. Brunozzi, 302 Pa. 
Super. 166, 171, 448 A.2d 579, 582 (1982) (citations omitted) (holding that 
former accountant did not betray type of confidence protected by the 
accountant-client privilege). See also, Bowman, 358 F.2d at 423 (stating 
that "[s]ince the statute is in derogation of the common law which does not 
accord an accountant-client privilege, the privilege which it accords must 
be strictly construed."). 
In discussing the privilege, the federal courts have given it a narrow 
interpretation and have refused to apply it in certain situations. For 
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example, in Detroit Coke Corporation v. NKK Chemical USA Inc., 1993 
WL 367060 at *1 (W.D.N.Y.), the court granted the defendant's motion for 
an order directing plaintiff's accountants to comply with a subpoena. The 
Detroit court stated that "[t]he accountant-client privilege is designed to 
encourage full divulgence to the accountant; it should not be used 
offensively to prevent a sued party's access to relevant and potentially 
vital information in challenging claims made against such party by the 
accountant's client." Id. at *2. In Emtec Inc. v. Condor Technology 
Solutions Inc, 1998 WL 242603 at **2-3 (E.D.Pa.), the court held that 
Pennsylvania's accountant-client privilege did not bar discovery of 
documents from the accountant's audit of plaintiff where the information 
sought was relevant to defendants' affirmative defenses in a breach of 
contract case. The court reasoned that "the client may waive the 
accountant-client privilege through conduct inconsistent with its assertion." 
Id. at *2. Likewise, in Samson Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields 
Inc., 92 F.R.D. 440, 441 (E.D.Pa. 1981 ), the court stated the following: 
"When the client commences a lawsuit the allegations of 
which make relevant information and knowledge in the 
possession of the accountant and when the information or 
knowledge would be discoverable from the client if it was in 
his possession, then the client should be deemed to have 
waived the privilege by initiating the suit. The privilege could 
not have been intended to cloak material that would be 
discoverable from the client if it was in the client's 
possession." Id. at 441. See also, In re Oxford Royal 
Mushroom Products Inc., 41 B.R. 863, 864-65 (E.D.Pa. 
1984) (holding that trustee was entitled to financial records 
to establish the size of the debtor's bankruptcy estate and 
that Pennsylvania's accountant-client privilege did not apply 
in bankruptcy). 
The Supreme Court of Florida has also commented on implicit waivers in the 
context of the accountant-client privilege. In Savino v. Luciano, 92 So.2d 817, 818-819 
(Fla. 1957), a litigant invoked the accountant-client privilege during discovery to 
prevent the other party from gaining access to documents created by the accountant 
which would be necessary to prove the litigant's case at trial. In dealing with this issue, 
Florida Supreme Court first noted that, "The anomaly of his position is immediately 
apparent: for the purpose of barring the discovery procedure, the audit and report is 
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confidential and privileged; for the purpose of proving his case, it is not." Id. at 819. 
The Florida Supreme Court then ruled as follows: 
As in the case of all personal privileges, the accountant-client 
privilege may be waived by the client. And, as in all confidential and 
privileged communications, '[t]he justification for the privilege lies not in 
the fact of communication, but in the interest of the persons concerned 
that the subject matter should not become public.' Judge Learned Hand 
speaking in United States v. Krulewitch, 2 Cir., 145 F.2d 76, 79, 156 
A.L.R. 337. When a party himself ceases to treat a matter as confidential, 
it loses its confidential character. Cf Ludwig v. Montana Bank & Trsut Co., 
1940, 109 Mont. 477, 98 P.2d 377, 388; Wise v. Haynes, 
Tex.Civ.App.1937, 103 S.W.2d 477, 481. And when a party has filed a 
claim, based upon a matter ordinarily privileged, the proof of which will 
necessarily require that the privileged matter be offered in evidence, we 
think that he has waived his right to insist, in pretrial discovery 
proceedings, that the matter is privileged. See Van Heuverzwyn v. State, 
206 Misc. 896, 134 N.Y.S.2d 922, 924. 
We hold, therefore, that the defendant in the instant case has either 
expressly or impliedly waived the right to insist upon the privileged nature, 
if any, of the audit and report. The provision of Sec. 4 73.15, supra, that 'no 
such certified public accountant or public accountant shall be permitted to 
testify with respect to any of said matters, except with the consent writing 
of such client or his legal representative' is not applicable to the factual 
situation here. 
Maryland's Court of Appeals has also made the following comments about 
implicit waiver of the accountant client privilege: 
The accountant-client privilege, like all other personal privileges, 
may be waived by the client's conduct. See, e.g., Tofani, 297 Md. at 173, 
465 A.2d at 417 (holding that reporter shield law, § 9-112 of the Courts & 
Judicial Proceedings Article, may be waived when reporter acts in a 
manner inconsistent with the statutory privilege or the intention to rely on 
it); Harrison, 276 Md. at 137-38, 345 A.2d at 839 (recognizing waiver by 
implication for attorney-client privilege); see also In re Matthew R., 113 
Md.App. 701, 707-09, 688 A.2d 955, 957-58 (1997) (addressing argument 
regarding waiver by implication for psychiatrist-patient privilege); LYNN 
MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 501.1, at 464 (1987) ("All privileges 
may be waived, but only by their holder .... "). For example, the privilege 
may be waived by the client's disclosure to third parties. The accountant-
client privilege may also be waived by issue injection by the client in a 
lawsuit, when the client injects the professional activity or the advice of an 
accountant as an issue in a particular case. See In re Hillsborough 
Holdings Corp., 176 B.R. 223, 238-40 (M.D.Fla.1994). 
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Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gussin, 350 Md. 552, 565 (Md. 1998). According to the 
foregoing authorities, the accountant-client privilege is implicitly waived when the 
holder of the privilege injects the contents of the privileged communications into a 
lawsuit. 
In this case, the Morrisons implicitly waived the accountant client privilege by 
issue injection and reliance on Mr. Warr's documents to calculate the amount of 
restitution. At the second restitution hearing, defense counsel made the following 
objection to Ms. Morrison's invocation of the accountant-client privilege, "here is my 
problem. They're going to use Mr. Warr's documents for the presentence investigation, 
they can't claim privilege and turn around and say, okay, he can't testify as to what 
those documents are." (08/04/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.12-16.) Defense counsel also objected 
on the basis that Ms. Morrison's decision to discuss the contents of Mr. Warr's work 
product constitutes a waiver. (08/11/11 Tr., p.97, Ls.14-16.) 
The Morrisons' reliance on Mr. Warr's work product during the presentence 
process also waived the accountant-client privilege. The presentence investigator 
stated that the Morrisons did not keep a log of the amount of money that went into the 
ATM "but they had their accountant come up with an amount of loss from the ATM the 
spreadsheet showed a substantial loss each year going back to 2004." (PSI, p.3.) 
Ms. Morrison told the presentence investigator that "[b]ased on further investigation, 
her confession and in depth accounting we had proof [that Ms. Hurles stole money 
from the ATM]." (PSI, p.5 (emphasis added).) 
At the first restitution hearing, before the accountant-client privilege was 
invoked, Ms. Morrison relied solely on Mr. Warr's work product to establish the amount 
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of restitution for the money taken from the petty cash. When asked how she calculated 
the amount of money Ms. Hurles stole, Ms. Morrison replied as follows: 
I have records from my then accountant, James Warr, who showed 
an imbalance in the credits and the debits of the A TM of checks written to 
the ATM; credits meaning the money that was dispensed and paid back to 
my bank account from the ATM company. And those differences are what 
you see in column 4, I believe it fs, a total of 154-some-thousand-dollars. 
I don't know if I am in the right column But those differences 
between what he tracked as being what was supposed to be money in 
and money out is $139,000, I think it is. 
Q [Trial Counsel]. Okay. Just for our purposes, what am I talking 
about here is what he tracked to you is that the A TM figures were inflated? 
A [Ms. Morrison]. Correct. They were not correct. 
Q. [Trial Counsel]. You say that you have got records to show 
where the cash went once it was cashed at the bank; is that right? 
A. [Ms. Morrison]. I have accounting records from my accountant 
that show that the checks that were written to - supposed to be deposited 
into the ATM are short- are short by about $139,000. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.71, L.21 - p.73, L.10.) When asked about her records of cash 
transactions she stated "I have records of them. I have - we have daily cash 
recordings that we do every day. We have a monthly spreadsheet that is provided to 
my accountant." (05/19/11 Tr., p.77, L.23 - p.78, L.1.) 
Even after invoking the accountant-client privilege the Morrisons still relied on 
Mr. Warr's work product: 
And again, Your Honor, the figures that Mr. Warr did give that were 
reflected in the police reports, have already been provided in the form of 
the presentence investigation, and so part of the invocation there, that's 
their privilege, that's their right to invoke it, but from the state's 
perspective, his view that there was a theft, and the fact that it was over 
$100,000 is already documented in the police reports, and so I think we 
can go forward, from the state's view, with that as background that has 
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already been provided by that witness and is attached to the presentence 
report and that's part of the original police reports. 
(08/04/11 Tr., p.16, L.25-p.17, 11.) 
Defense counsel also argued that Ms. Morrison waived the privilege because 
she disclosed communications between herself and Mr. Warr. Defense counsel made 
the following objection at the second restitution hearing, "When Ms. Morrison testified, 
my recollection is that she had a - she spoke on - in either direct examination or on 
cross examination, about conversations she had with her accountant, which I think, 
waives the accountant/client privilege." (08/11/11 Tr .. p.96, Ls.5-10.) During the initial 
investigation concerning the ATM, Mr. Warr participated in the investigation of the 
Boise Police Department and explained how the internal bookkeeping operations of the 
No Lawyers Bar functioned. (PSI, p.214.) During the first restitution hearing 
Ms. Morrison also testified that Mr. Warr told her about a $1,300.00 accounting 
discrepancy, and that he had created new booking procedures for the No Lawyers Bar 
after discovering various accounting problems and Ms. Hurles theft. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.62, L.24 - p.70, L.11.) 
Additionally, the Morrisons waived the accountant-client privilege when they had 
defense counsel speak with Mr. Warr about the amount of restitution. Defense counsel 
also objected the invocation of privilege on the following bases, "Your Honor, this is a 
witness given to me by the state, subpoenaed by the State to the original restitution 
hearing. No privilege was ever requested." (08/11/11 Tr., p.97, Ls.17-20.) At the 
original restitution hearing, the following dialogue occurred: 
Q [Trial Counsel]. Okay. And through this process, were you able to 
detect this amount of loss? 
A [Ms. Morrison]. No, because that's not where the amount of loss 
was coming from 
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Q [Trial Counsel}. So what I'm saying is, isn't it possible that 
Ms. Hurles wasn't cashing all of these checks but, instead, returning a 
significant portion back to the bar? 
A [Ms. Morrison]. I think that she's already admitted in her PSI that 
she would take checks to the bank and cash them, and a portion of that 
proceeds would go into the ATM. So I think that's pretty clear. 
Q [Trial Counsel}. Okay. So essentially what we are doing here today, 
then, we are just cataloging every single check and saying that she is 
responsible for that full amount; is that right? 
MR. CRAFTS: 3 Well, everyone agrees that she didn't take the full 
amount of these checks. 
THE COURT: I don't think everyone agrees to that. 
MR. CRAFTS: The problem is - and your going to hear from the 
accountant - is that we just don't have the records to establish that. 
They say that. ... [T]his figure has gone from $90 to $284,000 back 
down to $160,000. And the amount-
THE COURT: Okay. So your're going to call an accountant yet today? 
MR. CRAFTS: I apologize for that. I can tell the court, too, that 
there is a lot of layers to this thing. And as I went and met with Givens 
Pursley, as I went and met with the accountant .... 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.78, L.6 - p.80, L.16.) The district court initiated the following dialogue 
at the second restitution hearing: 
Looks to me like the only thing that that stands between the 
restitution figure being requested and the client paying that amount is 
potentially whether or not the - you can impeach the victim through the 
accountant. 
A [Trial Counsel}. Correct. 
Q. [The Court]. Is that what you want to do? 
3 Charles Crafts is Ms. Hurles' defense counsel. 
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A. [Trial Counsel]. Correct. 
Q [The Court]. And I'm just curious; why is it - how did you gain 
knowledge that the accountant may have information that would be 
impeaching? 
A [Trial Counsel]. Judge, like I said, IVlr. Warr was originally - he is the 
state's witness. 
Q [The Court]. Did you talk to him? 
A. [Trial Counsel]. He was subpoenaed by - he was subpoenaed. 
Q [The Court]. You talked to him? 
A [Trial Counsel]. I did talk to him 
Q [The Court]. So he potentially breached client relationship at that 
point. 
(08/11/11 Tr., p.98, L.22 - p.99, L.17.) The decision to have defense counsel speak 
with Mr. Warr over the amount of restitution and how he calculated that amount is a 
waiver of privilege. This position is also consistent with I.R.E. 510 which states that the 
holder of a privilege waives the privilege if s/he "consents to disclosure of any 
significant part of the matter or communication." The Morrisons put Mr. Warr's work 
product at issue when they had him participate in the police investigation, relied on his 
work during the presentence investigation, testified about his work product and 
confidential conversations at the original restitution hearing, and had defense counsel 
contact him to discuss his restitution calculations. 
Mr. Warr's testimony is necessary because it is the only means by which the 
district court and Ms. Hurles could get an accurate restitution estimate. The Morrisons 
indicated that there was no log of the amount of money that went into the ATM each 
day, but they had their accountant come up with an amount of loss from the ATM. 
(PSI, p.3; 05/19/11 Tr., p.65, L.21 - p.66, L.9, R., p.70, Ls.12-14.) Since Ms. Hurles 
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was cashing checks, then returning a portion of the proceeds into the ATIVI, there is no 
way of calculating the restitution without the Mr. Warr's testimony. 
Mr. Warr's testimony was also necessary to impeach Ms. Morrison. Defense 
counsel also alleged that the Morrisons were taking money from the petty cash in the 
same manner as Ms. Hurles. (05/19/11 Tr., p.75, Ls.12-15.) The implication is that 
the Morrisons were asking for money they took from the A TM to be included in the 
restitution. However, Ms. Morrison testified that neither she nor her husband borrowed 
money from the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.62, Ls.2-23., p.67, L.16 - p.68, L.7, p.75, Ls.20-
23.) When Ms. Morrison was asked "Didn't your accountant actually confront you with 
the checks signed and endorsed by [Mr. Morrison], and you denied it for five months," 
Ms. Morrison answered no. (05/19/11 Tr., p.69, Ls.22-25.) As such, Ms. Hurles needs 
the testimony of Mr. Warr to impeach Ms. Morrison over her assertion that the 
Morrisons were not taking money out of the ATM. If defense counsel's position is true, 
then Ms. Morrison knowingly lied to the court by inflating the amount of money 
Ms. Hurles stole from them. According to defense counsel "[EJeven hiring a CPA is 
not going to be able to get us to the admissions made by the alleged victims in this 
case, which is really what we needed from Mr. Warr anyway .... " (08/04/11 Tr., p.22, 
Ls.7-10.) 
In sum, the Morrisons implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege as to the 
documents and conversations used to establish the amount of restitution Ms. Hurles 
owes the Morrisons. If defense counsel's assertions are correct, the current amount of 
restitution was intentionally inflated by the Morrisons and Mr. Warr's testimony is the 
best means to establish the amount of restitution. Moreover, there was no reason for 
the Morrisons to invoke the accountant-client privilege if they were telling the truth. As 
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such, the district court erred when it determined that the Morrisons did not waive the 
accountant-client privilege and, in doing so, might have enabled the Morrisons to get 
away with lying to the court. 
11. 
The District Court's Restitution Calculation Was Not Supported By Substantial And 
Competent Evidence 
A Introduction 
At the first restitution hearing, defense counsel established various problems 
with the spreadsheet created by Givens Pursley to establish the amount of restitution. 
Many of the checks should not have been included in the restitution, as they were 
endorsed by the Morrisons, W.B., and D.B. Additionally, the spreadsheet included the 
total amount of the cashed checks and did not consider the fact that Ms. Hurles was 
only keeping between ten and twenty percent of the checks. The decision to prevent 
Mr. Warr from testifying precluded Ms. Hurles from correcting these errors. 
Additionally, the restitution statute, LC. § 19-5304, requires that there be a 
causal relationship between a defendant's criminal acts and the victim's injuries in 
order for a court to order restitution. In this case, Ms. Hurles was charged with thefts 
that occurred between December of 2008 and December of 2009, and Ms. Hurles 
pleaded guilty to thefts which occurred during the same period of time. However, 
Ms. Hurles' restitution order includes the losses which began in 2005. Ms. Hurles 
argues that she was not charged with, and did not plead guilty to, any thefts between 
2005 and November of 2008. As such, the restitution should not have included loss for 
any events which allegedly occurred between 2005 and November of 2008, as those 
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alleged losses are not causally related to the criminal acts for which Ms. Hurles was 
convicted. 
B. The District Court's Restitution Calculation Was Not Supported By Substantial 
And Competent Evidence 
1. The Restitution Award Included The Full Amount Of The Checks 
Ms. Hurles Cashed, Even Though She Only Took Ten To Twenty Percent 
Of The Cashed Checks 
The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the 
discretion of a district court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in 
I.C. § 19-5304(7) and by the policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who 
suffer economic loss. State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822 (Ct App. 2010). In 
reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion, this Court must determine whether the 
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; 
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 378 (Ct. App. 2004). The trial court 
is directed by statute to base the amount of economic loss to be awarded upon the 
preponderance of evidence submitted to the trial court by the prosecutor, defendant, 
victim, or presentence investigator. Lombard, 149 Idaho at 822 (citing I.C. § 19-
5304(6)). The determination of the amount of restitution is a question of fact for the trial 
court whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. Id. 
The State has the burden of proving the amount of restitution. State v. Nienburg, 153 
Idaho 491, 497-498 (Ct. App. 2012). 
In determining the amount of restitution for a crime victim, the trial court, "shall 
consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the 
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offense, the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such 
other factors as the court deems appropriate." Lombard, 149 Idaho at 822-823 (quoting 
I.C. § 19-5304(7)). "Restitution may only be awarded for actual economic loss 
suffered by the victim." Id. at 823 (citing I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a)(2)). 
At the original restitution hearing, various problems were identified in the 
spreadsheet created by Givens Pursley and the State's restitution calculation, which 
were never resolved. At the final restitution/sentencing hearing, defense counsel made 
the following argument about the amount of restitution: 
In terms of what the actual figure was, I requested tax records. Tax 
records, they opposed on obtaining tax records. And if you take a look at 
this spreadsheet that's given I know we are not talking about restitution . 
. . [at this point in the hearing], but I think I need to make a record of it -- it 
really has no value whatsoever in an accounting. All you really have in 
that column on the spreadsheet is just a log of checks. We don't have 
what their profits were, we don't know what their losses were. We don't 
know if they are claiming losses on these things. I know they say that are 
claiming losses. I don't know that information, and my job my circle of 
responsibility here for Ms. Hurles is to figure out what were the profits, 
what were the losses. All I have is a window of checks that were cashed. 
If I could from my understanding -- this is basically how Ms. Hurles 
was stealing money. She would takes these checks; this money was 
supposed to go into the ATM machine. By their account -- this is why I 
personally struggle with this particular case by their account, if we take 
that restitution figure, that means that every single check that she cashed 
she took for herself. By logical extension, what that means is that [the] 
ATM would never have any money in it. She would literally take every 
single penny that was supposed to go into the ATM. 
Ms. Hurles says what she would do was, she would go cash these 
checks. She would get ... $1,5000. She would keep [$200 to $300] for 
herself and she would put [$1,200 to $1,300] in the ATM machine. What 
we don't have is ... records from the A TM machine. 
And it's very difficult for me to just say there is a figure out there that 
represents what was taken from the A TM when we don't have that 
information. 
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Once again, we are bound by the accountant/client privilege, and I 
can't pursue that. So it's their choice not to reveal this information. 
(08/11/11 Tr., p.119, L.25 - p.122, L.21.) Defense counsel then stated that twenty to 
thirty percent of the restitution requested by the Morrisons matches the $20,000.00 to 
$50,000.00 amount that Ms. Hurles admitted she stole. (08/11/11 Tr., p.122, L.20 -
p.123, L.1.) The district court then said that "[t]here is an approximate additional 
$100,000 ... they believe was taken by her .... "4 (08/11 /11 Tr., p.123, Ls.2-5.) 
Defense counsel then pointed out that those "checks are ... signed by the Morrisons." 
(08/11/11 Tr., p.123, Ls.6-7.) Defense counsel then stated: 
[She] may wish to file an appeal. I think I need to make a record of this 
last issue, and that is, from my perspective and the problem that we have 
here, basically, is that the Morrisons were doing the exact same thing. 
They were taking money that was supposed to go to the ATM account and 
they were cashing these checks. We have checks made out to the ATM 
that were signed by [the Morrisons]. 
(08/11/11 Tr., p.124, Ls.2-10.) The implication is that the Morrisons were requesting 
restitution from Ms. Hurles for money they removed from the ATM account and they 
used it for their own purposes. 
Additionally, Ms. Berriochoa, the paralegal from Givens Pursley who created the 
spreadsheet testified that her total did not take into account the fact that Ms. Hurles 
deposited between eighty to ninety percent of the checks' proceeds into the ATM. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-18.) Ms. Berriochoa also testified that many of the checks 
were accidentally categorized as ones Ms. Hurles cashed, when in reality they were 
endorsed by either of the Morrisons and not Ms. Hurles. (05/19/11 Tr., p.34, L.19 -
p.36, L.14.) Ms. Morrison also testified that the checks Ms. Berriochoa accidentally 
4 The Morrisons agreed to not seek restitution for the $100,000.00 which was related to 
checks they endorsed. (08/11 /11 Tr., p.123, Ls.2 - p.124, Ls.10.) 
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accredited to Ms. Hurles' restitution total were in fact cashed by the Morrisons. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.50, L.18- p.51, L.20.) Some of the checks had the initials W.B. and 
0.8., and Ms. Morrison could not identify those people. (05/19/11 Tr., p.60, L.12 -
p.61, L.14.) Ms. Berriochoa also testified that she has no accounting background, she 
only had a small degree of familiarization with the Morrisons' bookkeeping procedures, 
she had no idea what happened to any of the checks after they were cashed, and she 
had no idea who cashed $114,000.00 of the checks. (05/19/11 Tr., p.33, L.23 - p.36, 
L.25.) 
The restitution amount requested by the Morrisons was not credible, as there 
were significant ranges of restitution estimates. The Morrisons told the presentence 
investigator that the amount of restitution they were requesting was $149,220.00. (PSI, 
p.6.) The attorney from Givens Pursley concluded that the restitution was $284, 
830.00. (PSI, p.187.) The Boise Police Department concluded that the amount of 
money taken from the ATM was $108,500.00. (PSI, p.214.) However, Ms. Hurles only 
endorsed a number of checks that totaled $39,000.00. (05/19/11 Tr., p.56, Ls.23 -
p.57, L.4.) 
Additionally, the restitution figure should have been offset by an insurance 
payment the Morrisons received. The Morrisons received an insurance payment of 
$2,500.00, and the insurance company was requesting reimbursement from 
Ms. Hurles. 5 (PSI, p.6, 310.) This money should have offset the amount of restitution 
awarded to the Morrison because that $2,500.00 for compensation for Ms. Hurles theft. 
Without such an offset, the Morrisons are getting double recovery. 
5 Ms. Hurles recognizes that she is liable to the insurance company for the $2,500.00. 
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In sum, there are many problems with the restitution estimates provided by the 
Morrisons. The main problem is that Ms. Hurles was only taking ten to twenty percent 
of the checks she cashed, but Ms. Berriochoa said she did not take that into 
consideration. Additionally, many of the checks were endorsed by the Morrisons, 
W.B., and D.B. but were included into the restitution total. As argued in Section I, 
supra, many of these issues could have been resolved if the Morrisons' accountant, 
Mr. Warr, would have testified, but the Morrisons used the accountant-client privilege 
as a means to prevent him from clarifying the errors in the restitution total. Since none 
of these issues were resolved, the restitution ordered by the district court is not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Included 
Restitution For Checks Which Were Cashed Between 2005 And 
November Of 2008 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which an appellate court 
exercises free review. Fields v. State, 149 Idaho 399, 401 (2010). Idaho Code§ 19-
5304(2) permits a court to order restitution for any person who suffers an economic 
loss that results from a defendant's criminal activities. State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 
602 (2011 ). "The statute defines victim as 'a person or entity, who suffers economic 
loss or injury as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct."' Id. (quoting I.C.-19-
5304(1 )(e)(i) (original emphasis)). "The term economic loss includes 'the value of 
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-
pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal 
conduct. m Id. (quoting I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) (original emphasis)). A causal connection 
between the defendant's criminal conduct and the injuries suffered by the victim must 
exist in order for the district court to order restitution. Id. The question of causation is 
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one fact for the district court to decide and the decision on whether to order restitution 
is left to the sound discretion of the district court Id. The district court's factual 
findings will not be disturbed on appeal provided they are supported by substantial 
evidence. Id. 
The remaining standard of review was articulated in Section 11(8)(1 ), supra, and 
is incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
In this case, the Information in this matter charged Ms. Hurles with grand theft 
and alleged that she stole money from the No Lawyers Bar from December 2008 to 
December 2009. (R., pp.26-27.) At the change of plea hearing, Ms. Hurles admitted to 
stealing money from the No Lawyers Bar during the same period of time. (02/17/11 
Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.3.) At the final restitution/sentencing hearing, Ms. Hurles stated 
that she only took money for fourteen months, not for five years as the Morrisons 
claimed. (08/11/11 Tr., p.128, Ls.18-22.) At the first restitution hearing, the State was 
requested restitution for alleged thefts which occurred from 2005 to 2010. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.73, L.11 - p.74, L.6.) It appears that the district court ordered restitution based 
on the State's request. (R., pp.71-72.) 
Ms. Hurles argues that I.C. § 19-5304 only allows the district court to award 
restitution for the alleged thefts that occurred from December of 2008 to December of 
2009, and any restitution which was based on thefts which occurred outside of that 
period should not have been included in the restitution order. As stated above, 
I.C. § 19-5304 requires a causal relationship between the criminal act and the 
damages resulting in restitution. Idaho Code Section 19-5304(1)(b) states that, 
"'Found guilty of any crime"' shall mean a finding by a court that a defendant has 
committed a criminal act and shall include an entry of a plea of guilty, an order 
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withholding judgment, suspending sentence, or entry of judgment of conviction for a 
misdemeanor or felony." When I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(b) is read in light of I.C. § 19-
5403(1 )(a) and I.C. § 19-5403 (1)(e)(i), it indicates that the causal relationship must be 
with the actual crime to which the defendant was convicted. That proposition it borne 
out of the fact I.C. § 19-5403(1 )(b), defines "found guilty of any crime" to mean the 
actual crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty. Since Ms. Hurles pleaded guilty to 
thefts which occurred from December 2008 to December 2009, those are the only 
thefts for which restitution can be ordered. However, the district court ordered 
restitution for alleged thefts which were not charged in the information and to which 
Ms. Hurles never pleaded guilty. Thus, the district court's restitution order runs afoul 
I.C. § 19-5304 and should be recalculated to only include the alleged thefts from 
December of 2008 to December of 2009. Further support for Ms. Hurles position is 
found in State v. Hargas, 126 Idaho 727, 730 (Ct App. 1995), where it was held that in 
the event multiple charges are brought and then some are dismissed, absent an 
agreement to the contrary, restitution cannot be ordered for injuries or damages 
caused by the dismissed charges. 
As a final note, Ms. Hurles consistently stated that she did not start stealing 
money until her husband lost his job in 2008. (PSI, pp.6-7.; 08/11/11 Tr., p.128, Ls.18-
22.) More importantly, Ms. Morrison primarily based her belief that Ms. Hurles began 
stealing in 2004 on nothing more than admitted speculation. Specifically, Ms. Morrison 
told the presentence investigator "her theft over the last 6 years (we have to assume it 
has been going on her whole length of employment in one way or another) .... " (PSI, 
p.5.) Even though the No Lawyers Bar had accounting discrepancies that went back to 
2004, many of those could be explained by the fact that the Morrisons might have been 
27 
taking money out of the petty cash in the same manner as Ms. Hurles. (08/11 /1 ·1 
Tr., p.124, Ls.2-10.) This position is further supported by the fact that the Morrisons 
were willing to forgo approximately $100,000.00 of their original restitution estimate 
after defense counsel pointed out that the Morrisons were the ones who endorsed 
those checks. (08/'11/11 Tr., p.122, L.10-p.124, L.10.) As argued in Section I, supra, 
this could have been cleared up had the Morrisons allowed their accountant, Mr. Warr, 
to testify as to his restitution estimate. 
In sum, I.C § 19-5304 requires that there be a causal relationship between the 
charged offense and the injuries suffered by the victim in order for restitution be 
awarded to cover the cost of those injuries. In this case, the district court ordered 
restitution for uncharged conduct in contravention of I.C. § 19-5304. As such, a new 
restitution hearing should be ordered in order for restitution to be calculated in 
compliance with 1.C. § 19-5304. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Included Civil Attorney Fees As Part 
Of The Restitution Awarded In The Criminal Proceedings 
A Introduction 
The Morrisons, owners of the No Lawyers Bar, hired a civil law firm, Givens 
Pursley, to litigate issues related to Ms. Hurles theft. It appears that the Morrisons 
sued their accountant, Mr. Warr, the Bank of America, and intervened in Ms. Hurles 
Bankruptcy. (PSI, p.52.) Additionally, Givens Pursley helped the Morrisons prepare 
for the criminal restitution hearing in this case and billed $14,876.73 for its efforts. 
(PSI, p.52.) Givens Pursley's total bill for this ligation was $48,734.61, which was 
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included in the restitution award over Ms. Hurles objection.6 Ms. Hurles argues that the 
district Court erred when it included the civil attorneys fees in the restitution order as 
civil attorney fees have been characterized by the Idaho Court of Appeals as non-
economic damages which are not awardable pursuant to Idaho's criminal restitution 
statute I.C. §19-5304. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Included Civil Attorney Fees As 
Part Of The Restitution Awarded In The Criminal Proceedings 
As a preliminary note, the applicable standards of review has been articulated in 
Sections II (8)(1) and 11(8)(2), supra, and are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
Idaho Code Section 19-5403(11 ), states that "[a]n order of restitution shall not 
preclude the victim from seeking any other legal remedy." However, "[o]ne of the 
purposes of restitution is to obviate the need for victims to incur the cost and 
inconvenience of a separate civil action in order to gain compensation for their losses." 
State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78 (Ct. App. 2010). Additionally, I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) 
"disallows restitution for noneconomic damages that might be available in a civil 
lawsuit, such as pain and suffering, wrongful death, emotional distress, and the like." 
Id. 
The issue of the availability for civil attorneys fees under I.C. § 19-5304 was 
addressed in State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165 (Ct. App. 2006). In that case, the 
defendant, Ms. Parker, was working as a bookkeeper for the victims and cashed 
approximately $18,000.00 of unauthorized checks. Id. at 166. Ms. Parker was 
charged with ten counts of forgery and, in addition, the victim filed a civil action against 
6 The district court entered a restitution order separately listing the amounts of 
restitution for the stolen money and the attorney fees. (R., pp.71-72.) 
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Ms. Parker and others. Id. Ms. Parker then pleaded guilty to one count of forgery and 
the remaining counts were dismissed. Id. The district court then entered a withheld 
judgment and placed Ms. Parker on probation. Id. As a term of her probation, 
Ms. Parker was required to pay restitution for the forged checks and she was required 
to pay $16,133.75 for attorney fees the victim incurred in the civil case. Id. at 166-167. 
Ms. Parker appealed and argued that the victim's attorney fees "were not a direct 
economic loss resulting from her criminal conduct, and therefore not appropriate as 
restitution or as a condition of probation." Id. at 167. 
In resolving this issue the Court of Appeals first noted that I.C. § 19-5304(2) only 
allows restitution to be ordered for economic loss. Id. The Court then noted that a 
victimized business could recover, as restitution, salaries it paid its employees to "for 
investigating the extent of the defendant's theft." Id. However, the Court reasoned that 
"[i]t does not follow, however, that restitution may be ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-
5304 for any out-of-pocket expense that the victim would not have incurred but for the 
defendant's crime." Id. (original emphasis). In fact, the Court had previously held that 
in some instances the expense of preventing future harm "was not compensable 
through a restitution order ... [as] a victim's own assessment of actions necessary to 
respond to a crime is not the correct measure for restitution under section 19-5304." 
Id. (citing State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624 (Ct. App. 2004)). The Court of 
Appeals then ruled as follows: 
With these authorities in mind, we conclude that the principal 
question in assessing the restitution award for attorney fees in the present 
case is whether the attorney fees for filing the civil lawsuit were an 
expense that was necessary in order for the victim to recover the losses 
caused by Parker's forgeries. It is apparent that they were not. The only 
claim alleged in the civil complaint relating to the forged checks was for 
the amount of the forged checks, which is precisely what the victim was 
clearly entitled to receive and did receive in the restitution order. The 
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victim's civil complaint also claimed damages for overpayment of wages 
that resulted from Parker submitting false time sheets, and for conspiracy 
and unjust enrichment related to two other defendants. None of these 
additional damages are alleged to have resulted from the forgeries. Under 
these circumstances, the lawsuit and the associated attorney fees were 
unnecessary to recover the victim's direct loss caused by the forgeries, for 
that loss was entirely compensable through the restitution order in the 
criminal case. Any judgment that the victim might have recovered in the 
civil litigation for the forged checks would have been duplicative of the 
restitution ordered in the criminal case. Therefore, the attorney fees 
related to the lawsuit are not an economic loss compensable through a 
restitution order under I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a). 
Id. at 168. The Court of Appeals also addressed a separate issue dealing with the 
question of whether the victim's same civil attorney fees could be ordered as a term of 
the defendant's probation. Id. The Court of Appeals' holding on that issue follows: 
[W]e conclude that the ordered payment of the victim's attorney fees was 
not a permissible condition of probation. As explained above, the victim's 
civil action encompassed several claims that were not based upon the 
charged forgeries and also encompassed claims against third persons. It 
therefore is not clear whether or to what extent the attorney fees represent 
"resulting harm" from the crime to which Parker pleaded guilty. Of equal 
importance, the validity of the victim 1s civil claims against Parker, other 
than the claim for the forgery, have not been adjudicated. Parker's guilty 
plea in the criminal case did not include an admission of the other alleged 
wrongdoing delineated in the victim's civil complaint, and there has been 
no judicial determination that Parker bears liability on those claims. It was 
premature, therefore, for the trial court to order Parker's payment of 
attorney fees incurred by the victim to pursue claims of unknown validity. 
The merits of the underlying claims, and of the victim's request for an 
award of attorney fees incurred in pursuing those claims, must be 
determined in the civil action. 
Id. at 168-169. 
In this case, Ms. Hurles did object to the inclusion of the attorney fees at the 
original restitution hearing. (05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.18-19.) The district court ultimely 
ordered Ms. Hurles to pay $48,734.61 for attorneys fees. (R., pp.71-72.) 
The nature of the civil lawsuits in this matter are somewhat unclear, however, 
the lawsuit against Mr. Warr was filed and based on a breach of duty he owed as an 
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accountant to the Morrisons. (08/04/11 Tr., p.1 L.16 - p.14, L.5.) Under the holdings 
in Parker, this is not compensable because it is a not based Ms. Hurles' thefts, but 
Mr. Warr's alleged breach of his duty to the Morrisons. Further, it is a lawsuit against a 
third party which was also a reason to deny the restitution award in Parker. The basis 
for the lawsuit against Bank of America is unclear from the record, but at a minimum 
the attorney fees for that lawsuit are not compensable under the reasoning in Parker 
because, as with the lawsuit against Mr. Warr, it is against a third party. Finally, neither 
of these lawsuits were final at the time of the restitution/sentencing hearings, and that 
same lack of finality was another reason why restitution could not be ordered for the 
civil lawsuits in Parker. (08/11/11 Tr., p.118, L.24-p.119, L.5, 125, L.25- p.126, L.4.) 
The intervention in Ms. Hurles' bankruptcy was not compensable because the 
only logical reason for the Morrisons to intervene in the Hurles bankruptcy proceeds 
would be to secure funds from the bankruptcy estate. Such an action is a means to 
prevent a future harm, and the Parker case stated that preventing future harm "was not 
compensable through a restitution order ... [as] a victim's own assessment of actions 
necessary to respond to a crime is not the correct measure for restitution under section 
19-5304." Id. at 167 (citing State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624 (Ct. App. 2004)). 
As such, the attorney fees associated with the intervention in Ms. Hurles' bankruptcy 
proceedings are not compensable under I.C. § 19-5304. 
Further, Ms. Hurles argues that the award of civil attorneys' fees in the amount 
of $14,876.73 for a paralegal to create a spreadsheet constitutes an abuse of 
discretion as those fees are unreasonable. It is hard to fathom how Givens Pursley 
accumulated $14,876.73 in fees to create a spreadsheet, especially since Mr. Warr, an 
accountant, had already created a spreadsheet showing the Morrisons' losses. (PSI, 
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p.3.) The work appears somewhat duplicative as Mr. VVarr's work product was used in 
the presentence investigation and, as argued in Section I, supra, was heavily relied on 
to establish the Morrisons' restitution estimate. (PSI, p.3.) Moreover, this work should 
have been performed by an accountant as the $14,876.73 spreadsheet was replete 
with errors and only caused confusion. 7 See Section Il(B)(1 ), supra. In fact, Givens 
Pursley estimated that the amount of restitution was $284,839.00 (PSI, p.188), and that 
estimate was so unreliable the restitution ultimately ordered was $155,440.00. 
(R., pp.71-72.) As such, the district court abused its discretion when it ordered 
unreasonable attorney fees. 
In the event this Court grants relief based on the argument set forth in Section 
ll(B)(2), supra, Ms. Hurles also argues that the $14,876.73 figure should be 
recalculated to exclude time billed for cataloguing checks falling outside of the 
December 2008 to December 2009 time period, as restitution based on that work is not 
causally related to the actions for which Ms. Hurles was convicted. 
In sum, the attorneys fees for the third party lawsuits are not compensable 
economic damages under I.C. § 19-5304 and the Parker holding because those 
lawsuits were against third parties and were not final at the time of the 
restitution/sentencing hearings. Additionally, the lawsuit against Mr. \Narr was based 
on an alleged breach of a duty he owed to the Morrisons and were, therefore, not 
based on the Ms. Hurles' charged thefts. The attorney fees for the intervention into 
7 Ms. Berriochoa, the paralegal that created the spreadsheet, testified that she has no 
accounting background, she only had a small degree of familiarization with the 
Morrisons' bookkeeping procedures, she miscategorized some of the checks in the 
spreadsheet, she had no idea what happened to any of the checks' proceeds after they 
were cashed, and she had no idea who cashed $114,000.00 of the checks. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.24, L.16 - p.26, L.22, p.33, L.23 - p.36, L.25.) 
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the Hurles' bankruptcy are not compensable as they represent the prevention of a 
future harm which is not awardable as restitution. As such, the district court abused its 
discretion when it ordered civil attorney fees as part of the criminal restitution because 
that decision did not comport with the applicable legal standards. Additionally, the 
district court abused its discretion when it ordered civil attorneys' fees for the work 
performed in preparation of the restitution hearing as that work was unreliable, 
duplicative, and therefore, unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Hurles respectfully requests that this case be remanded for another 
restitution hearing with instructions that the district court allow Mr. Warr to testify and 
that restitution only be ordered for the thefts which occurred from December 2008 to 
December of 2009. Ms. Hurles also requests an instruction consistent with this Court's 
rulings on the issues relating to the civil attorneys' fees. In the event this Court 
determines that the Morrisons did not waive the accountant-client privilege, or any 
other claim of error is deemed meritless, Ms. Hurles alternatively requests that this 
case be remanded for new restitution hearing with applicable instructions as to any of 
Ms. Hurles' prevailing claims of error. 
DATED this 4th day of January, 2013. 
!/''--
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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